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Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.-The antifraud provisions of
the federal securities laws will not be applied extraterritorially to
losses from sales of securities to foreign investors which occur
outside the United States unless acts within the United States
directly caused such losses.
INTRODUCTION
The recent surge of foreign investment in United States se-
curities has prompted foreign investors to demand protection
under United States securities laws. Such investments are often
in the form of offshore mutual funds or hedge funds' which are
incorporated in favorable tax locations such as the Bahamas or
Panama. The Securities and Exchange Commission [hereinafter
referred to as SEC] does not require these funds to comply with
its registration requirements, which entail substantial periodic
disclosure of financial activities. The securities laws do not ex-
pressly create transnational jurisdiction. United States courts,
1. "An offshore mutual fund is a mutual fund which (1) is incorporated in a foreign
country, (2) does not sell to Americans, and (3) does not aim its sales campaign primarily
at residents of the country in which it is incorporated. Note, Offshore Mutual Funds:
Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 13 B.C. IND. & COM.
L. REV. 1225 (1972) (footnote omitted). See Comment,_The Offshore Hedge Fund, 8
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79 (1969). Many of these funds have appeared subsequent to the
enactment of the Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 1541 (1966) (codified in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). This legislation "broadened the qualifications for the
favorable tax treatment accorded foreigners 'not engaged in a trade or business within the
United States' to encompass large scale investment vehicles as well as individual inves-
tors," and "ended the taxation of dividend distributions by a corporation with United
States source income if the corporation was not engaged in a domestic business." Note,
United States Taxation and Regulation of Offshore Mutual Funds, 83 HARv. L. REV. 404,
405 (1969) (footnote omitted). These funds invest heavily in United States securities and
property. Id. at 406. For example, "it was reported in 1967 that fund subsidiaries of
Investors Overseas Services (I.O.S.) held over twenty per cent of the shares of several
American mutual funds and significant percentages of many others." Id. at 439 (footnote
omitted). See also SEC v. United Financial Group, 474 F.2d 354, 355-56 (9th Cir. 1973).
2. "The Congress that passed these extraordinary pieces of legislation [The Securi-
ties Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934] in the midst of the depression could have hardly
been expected to foresee the development of off-shore funds thirty years later." Bersch v.
Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 453 (1975). At
the turn of the century, United States courts often invoked a presumption that statutes
were not intended to be applied extraterritorially in the absence of a clear congressional
intent to the contrary. See Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 97 (1969). See, e.g., American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1900), in which the Supreme Court refused to give the Sherman
Act extraterritorial application. This presumption was initially eroded in antitrust and
trademark cases. See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (Lanham
Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq. (1970)); United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry.
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however, have demonstrated some interest in protecting the in-
tegrity of the securities market through the extraterritorial appli-
cation of the antifraud provisions.
Extraterritorial application of regulatory legislation neces-
sarily involves considerations of comity among nations.' In
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.,' the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit discussed whether a decision by a United States
court in favor of the defendants would bind the foreign plaintiffs
in their own courts. While a United States court need not abstain
from resolving a controversy simply because the decision might
not be recognized in a foreign court, one reason the Second Cir-
cuit in Bersch did abstain was the "near certainty" that a foreign
court would not recognize a United States decision. "Ultimately,
the concern is that domestic law be applied only to transactions
with which the United States has a significant connection or in-
terest."'
& Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913) (Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970)). In the
landmark decision of United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945), the Second Circuit, sitting for the Supreme Court, applied antitrust legislation to
conduct carried out by foreign defendants on foreign soil. The two jurisdictional require.
ments were stated to be an intent to affect and an actual effect upon United States com-
merce. In explaining the court's decision, Judge Learned Hand wrote:
We should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can
catch, for conduct which has no consequences within the United States ....
On the other hand, it is settled law . . . that any state may impose liabilities,
even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that
has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabil-
ities other states will ordinarily recognize.
148 F.2d at 443.
3. "[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains . . . ." Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). See also Note, American Adjudication of Transnational
Securities Fraud, 89 HARv. L. REv. 553, 554 (1976).
4. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 453 (1975).
5. 519 F.2d at 996. Uncontroverted affidavits submitted by England, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and Switzerland indicated that these countries would
refuse to recognize a decision adverse to defendants as "a bar to an action by their own
citizens." Further affidavits disclosed the existence of numerous claims, including claims
of United States citizens, pending in Switzerland against one of the defendants. The
possible application of a statute of limitations in a foreign country was viewed by the
Bersch court as an inadequate answer to the problem. In France, for example, the applica-
ble statute of limitations will continue to run until 1999. The court's position that defen-
dants in a case of this type deserve an early adjudication of the claims of foreign plaintiffs
was an added consideration behind its decision to eliminate the foreign investors from the
plaintiff class. 519 F.2d at 996-97.
6. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
CASE COMMENTS
I. BACKGROUND
In Bersch, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was
required to determine the extent to which federal securities laws
can be applied extraterritorially to protect investors whose losses
are due to fraudulent acts committed abroad. Three categories of
purchasers were described as members of the class bringing suit:
Americans resident in the United States, Americans resident
abroad, and foreigners, with the foreign purchasers representing
the majority of the class.'
Defendant I.O.S., Ltd. [hereinafter referred to as IOS] was
created in 1956 by defendant Bernard Cornfeld as "an interna-
tional sales and financial service organization principally engaged
in the sale and the management of mutual funds and complemen-
tary financial activities."' Organized under Canadian law, IOS
had its principal place of business in Geneva.9 Prior to 1968, the
stock of IOS and its subsidiaries had been held by Cornfeld, his
associates, and their employees.'" These shares were distributed
to the employees as "partial compensation" and "performance
incentive" with the understanding that in the near future IOS'
principal subsidiaries, and later IOS itself, would be taken pub-
lic." The employees would have an opportunity to profit substan-
tially as the result of such a public market in IOS. In 1968, IOS
floated 600,000 shares of IOS Management, Ltd., one of its princi-
pal subsidiaries. 2 Partly because of the overwhelming success of
this offering,"' the plan to offer shares of each of the subsidiaries
publicly was abandoned and it was decided that IOS itself would
be taken public as soon as it appeared feasible.
Accordingly, a plan encompassing three stock offerings was
formulated.' 4 The first and largest was an offering of 5,600,000
7. 519 F.2d at 977-78 n.2.
8. Id. at 978. I.O.S. Ltd. [hereinafter cited as IOS] was being liquidated in New
Brunswick, Canada, as the result of proceedings brought by the Public Trustee of the
Province of Ontario. Id. at n.4.
9. Id. at 978.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 978-79.
12. The shares of IOS Management, Ltd., were first offered at $12.50, trading
opened at $75.00, and by March, 1969, they had reached a peak of $180.00. Id. at 979.
13. The other motivation was a successful offering by a recently created competitor.
Gramco Management, Ltd., was an offshore mutual fund whose original offering price
initially doubled but soon fell drastically. Id. at n.6.
14. The offering plan was restricted by a prior settlement order between IOS and the
Securities and Exchange Commission [hereinafter cited as SEC] entered in May, 1967,
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shares underwritten by six United States and foreign defendants
[hereinafter referred to as Drexel Group].' 5 Shares were sold to
nationals of Europe, Asia, and Australia by prospectuses which
were printed abroad, but substantial activities related to the
preparation of the offering occurred in the United States. A sec-
ondary offering of 1,450,000 shares, the prospectus for which was
prepared in compliance with Canadian securities laws, was un-
derwritten by defendant J.H. Crang and Co., a Canadian invest-
ment house [hereinafter referred to as Crang].11 All shares were
sold in Canada to foreign nationals. The third distribution was
another secondary offering of 3,950,000 shares by defendant
Investors Overseas Bank, Ltd. [hereinafter referred to as IOB],
a Bahamian subsidiary of IOS.
All three offerings were made at approximately the same
time and for the same price, and each prospectus referred to the
other two offerings. The Drexel Group and IOB prospectuses were
substantially the same,'7 and both stated that the offerings were
not registered under United States securities laws.'" Each pro-
spectus contained a balance sheet, a financial statement, and a
report by defendant Arthur Andersen and Co., a United States-
to prevent distribution in the United States. "Upon entry of the Order based on this
stipulation, IOS and all its affiliates shall cease all sales of securities to United States
citizens or nationals wherever located, except for (i) offers and sales outside of the United
States . to officers, directors and full-time personnel of IOS and its subsidiaries." Id.
at 979.
15. Id. The Drexel Group included two American banking houses, Drexel Firestone,
Inc. and Smith, Barney and Co. (both of which had offices abroad), as well as four foreign
houses: Banque Rothschild; Hill Samuel and Co., Ltd.; Guinness Mahon and Co., Ltd.;
and Pierson Heldring and Pierson.
16. 519 F.2d at 980. The circuit court in Bersch eventually held that it lacked personal
jurisdiction over this defendant. See note 29 infra.
17. Crang's prospectus differed slightly to comply with the requirements of Canadian
securities law. Id. at 980.
18. It appears that these securities did not have to be registered with the SEC. In a
1964 release the SEC stated that it
has traditionally taken the position that the registration requirements of Section
5 of the [Securities] Act [of 1933] are primarily intended to protect American
investors. Accordingly, the Commission has not taken any action for failure to
register securities of United States corporations distributed abroad to foreign
nationals, even though use of jurisdictional means may be involved in the offer-
ing. It is assumed in these situations that the distribution is to be effected in a
manner which will result in the securities coming to rest abroad.
Id. at 981 n.12, quoting SEC Rel. No. 33-4708 & 34-7366 (1964), 1 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
1362. The fact that a security need not be registered does not preclude the application
of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws, particularly rule 10b-5, where parties
engage in fraud. 519 F.2d at 986 n.28. See also Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v.
Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1335-37 (2d Cir. 1972).
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based accounting firm, certifying that the statements made
therein fairly represented IOS' financial condition. The initial
offerings were fully subscribed, but the price of the shares grad-
ually dropped and by May, 1970, they were "virtually unsalea-
ble."'' IOS eventually passed into the control of Robert L. Vesco,
a resident of Costa Rica and a defendant in a number of actions
for fraud. 20
Plaintiff Howard Bersch, a citizen of the United States and
a resident of New York, purchased 600 shares of IOS common
stock through the IOB offering. Characterizing the three distribu-
tions as the "IOS Public Offering," Bersch brought a class action
on his own behalf and on behalf of all other purchasers regardless
of their nationality or residence.2' The complaint alleged viola-
tions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, including section 10(b), as well as common law
fraud.2 Charging the underwriting group with failure to exercise
due diligence, Bersch asserted that the underwriters "'impliedly
represented to the public that IOS was a suitable company for
public ownership' when, in part as a result of the refusal of other
investment houses to participate, they should have known that
it was not." The complaint further alleged that the records of
IOS and its subsidiaries were in such chaotic condition that de-
termination of IOS' financial condition was rendered impossible.
The plaintiffs claimed that Arthur Andersen and Co. failed to
19. 519 F.2d at 981.
20. Id.
21. Id. The number of purchasers in the proposed class was estimated by Bersch to
be 100,000. Id. at 977-78 n.2. This was later revised to about 50,000. Id.
22. Specifically, the complaint alleged violations of sections 12, 15, and 17 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 771, 77o, and 77q (1970); sections 10(b), 15(c)(1), and
20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§78j(b), 78o(c)(1), and 78t (1970);
and SEC Rules lOb-5 and 15cl-z, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5, 240.15c/-2 (1975). Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), is enforced through the application of
SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1975), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device [or] scheme . . . to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made. . . not mislead-
ing, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
23. 519 F.2d at 981.
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follow customary accounting procedures when performing the
audit, resulting in false and misleading financial statements.
Finally, it was asserted that negligent preparation of the prospec-
tus by the Drexel Group failed to reveal damaging illegal activity
by IOS and its officers.24
The initial issue before the district court was one of subject
matter jurisdiction. Pursuant to a motion for class certification,
in opposition to which the defendants first raised the issue of
excluding foreign nationals as members of the class, Judge Fran-
kel of the Southern District of New York allowed the case to
proceed as a class action but left for later determination three
basic issues: whether the court had subject matter and personal
jurisdiction, whether foreign purchasers should remain members
of the plaintiff class, and "whether and how the court's ultimate
judgment may be made binding upon foreign class members. '2 5
In December, 1972, the Drexel Group entered into a consent
order with plaintiff Bersch. Six months later, after extensive dis-
covery and with a motion to dismiss still pending, the Drexel
Group agreed to a stipulation of settlement. 2 During settlement
negotiation, the district court determined that it had subject
matter jurisdiction over the claims of both the foreign and United
States citizens in the class. The district court viewed the three
offerings as "sufficiently integrated and intertwined" to be con-
sidered as one for the purposes of examining jurisdictional is-
sues.2 1 Its finding that subject matter jurisdiction existed was
grounded on three bases: (1) sufficient activity within the United
States in connection with the Drexel Group offering; (2) sales of
stock to an estimated 386 United States citizens; and (3) suffi-
cient adverse effect on the United States securities market gener-
ated by the collapse of the price of IOS shares offered.2" Upon
24. The complaint alleged that IOS officers participated in the smuggling of currency
in developing nations, "in violation of their restrictive currency laws," and that as a result
those countries barred IOS from doing business within their territories. Id. at n.15.
25. 389 F. Supp. at 450. See text accompanying notes 3 & 5 supra.
26. 519 F.2d at 983. The settlement stipulation provided for a number of conditions
including a payment of $700,000 against an original claim for $110,000,000 plus interest
from 1969, an entry of final judgment against the settling defendants, and the "dismissal
with prejudice and on the merits of any other action brought in any court arising out of
any of the events described in the complaint." In addition, the settling defendants were
permitted to withdraw from the settlement if members of the class holding more than
300,000 shares of IOS common stock should withdraw.
27. 389 F. Supp. at 451.
28. Id. at 457-58. In addition, the court rejected the claims of Crang and Smith,
Barney and Co., a Drexel Group underwriter, to exemptions from liability under section
[Vol. 11:2
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motions to dismiss, the district court found IOS, but not Crang,
to be subject to in personam jurisdiction, and ordered the action
against Crang dismissed. 9
The Second Circuit granted leave for interlocutory appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and consolidated all pending appeals,
including plaintiff's appeal from the determination that Crang
was not subject to in personam jurisdiction. The district court's
finding that subject matter jurisdiction extended to all three cat-
egories of plaintiffs was restricted by the circuit court. The court
rejected the lower court's conclusion that subject matter jurisdic-
tion existed "with respect not only to the relatively few Ameri-
cans who had purchased IOS shares but to the many thousands
of foreign purchasers whom plaintiff sought to represent" 30 and
found instead that jurisdiction existed only with respect to Amer-
ican residents and Americans residing abroad.
30(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1970). Id. at 459. With
respect to a foreign transaction, section 30(b) exempts from the scope of the Act any
person "insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the
United States," unless by doing so he violates Commission rules promulgated to prevent
evasion of the Act. "Business in securities" has been construed so strictly as to be effec-
tively limited to foreign securities professionals, and not "persons who engage in isolated
foreign transactions." Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 207 (2d Cir.), rev'd on
other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). It
is also clear that transactions involving foreign issuers and/or foreign investors executed
on a United States stock exchange are subject to the full scope of liability under United
States securities laws. Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969); Selzer v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., 385 F. Supp. 415 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1970).
29. 389 F. Supp. at 461. The district court, while conceding that neither IOS nor
Crang was "present" or "doing business" in the United States, recognized another way
for a party to subject himself to the personal jurisdiction of the court: "[Wihere a
defendant has acted within a state or sufficiently caused consequences there, he may fairly
be subjected to its judicial jurisdiction even though he cannot be served with process in
the state. ... Id. at 460, quoting Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468
F.2d at 1340. The court determined, however, that Crang's activities within the United
States were limited to "de minimus preliminary discussions" which could "hardly be
considered acts out of which the cause of action arose." The second half of the test pre-
sented in Leasco allows the exercise of in personam jurisdiction where the defendant's
conduct abroad had a "substantial, direct, and foreseeable result in the United States."
389 F. Supp. at 461. The court concluded that Crang took special precautions to prevent
its sale of IOS shares to Americans, and had been assured that the Drexel Group and
IOB would observe this restriction. In addition, any impact which may have resulted
from the sales of IOS shares was neither direct nor could it have reasonably been foreseen
by Crang. The court therefore dismissed the complaint against Crang for lack of in per-
sonam jurisdiction, and the Second Circuit affirmed this order. 519 F.2d at 1000. On the
other hand, personal jurisdiction existed as to IOS because its meetings in the United
States were "directly related to the offerings, and information was discussed which later
was incorporated into the prospectuses." 389 F. Supp. at 460.
30. 519 F.2d at 986.
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The circuit court held specifically that the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws:
1. Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resi-
dent in the United States whether or not acts (or culpable
failures to act) of material importance occurred in this country;
and
2. Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resi-
dent abroad if, but only if, acts (or culpable failures to act) of
material importance in the United States have significantly
contributed thereto; but
3. Do not apply to losses from sales to foreigners outside the
United States unless acts (or culpable failures to act) within the
United States directly caused such losses.
3 1
In reaching its holding, the Second Circuit evaluated the three
jurisdictional bases relied upon by the district court.
1-[. THE EXTENT OF AcTIvITY OCCURRING WITHIN THE UNITED
STATES
The first basis of jurisdiction found by the district court was
premised upon the subjective territorial principle, as codified in
section 17 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States [hereinafter referred to as Restatement] .32
The court concluded that IOS, which was incorporated in the
Bahamas, was not simply a foreign corporation dealing in securi-
ties but one whose existence depended upon a- large amount of
United States activity.33 In a series of decisions prior to Bersch,
the Second Circuit and Southern District of New York had grad-
ually adopted the subjective territorial principle in applying
federal securities laws to foreign transactions. Kook v. Crang,34
decided in 1960, was one of the first decisions to consider the
extraterritorial application of the federal securities laws. The
Kook court refused to extend the protection of federal securities
31. Id. at 993.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17
(1965) provides that: "[a] state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law (a) attaching
legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory . . . and (b) relating to a
thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its territory."
33. 389 F. Supp. at 455-58. Although the district court viewed each individual act as
being of minimal significance, it concluded that United States activity in toto was essen-
tial in preparing the defrauding prospectuses. Id. at 457.
34. 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Crang, also a defendant in Bersch, had a
branch office in New York and was registered with the SEC at the time Kook was decided.
Crang's New York office was closed in 1969.
[Vol. 11:2
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laws to an American investor because all of the alleged fraudulent
acts of a foreign brokerage house had been conducted in Canada.
The court based its decision on a finding that Congress, in passing
legislation, was primarily concerned with domestic problems. 5
In Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell,
3
the Second Circuit went beyond Kook and ruled that where there
were material misrepresentations committed by a foreign defen-
dant within the United States, jurisdiction would extend not only
to such misrepresentations but would also encompass conduct
without the United States arising from the same transaction.
37
Thus, while the court remained within the framework of section
17 of the Restatement and relied on the existence of United States
activity, it adopted a more expansive view as to the propriety of
applying -federal securities laws extraterritorially. The court as-
serted that it is incorrect to assume that congressional intent
never extends beyond the Restatement; a court is "bound to fol-
low the Congressional direction unless this would violate the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
'38
Leasco was not decisive in Bersch because it concerned for-
eign defendants rather than foreign plaintiffs, but it did demon-
strate a trend toward broader application of the securities laws.
The district court in Bersch, while emphasizing that Leasco pred-
icated jurisdiction upon "significant conduct within the terri-
tory," chose to follow this broader trend. While finding the
United States activity to be "less direct" than that in Leasco, the
district court in Bersch reasoned that conduct within the United
States providing an "essential link" in the commission of fraudu-
lent activity is jurisdictionally sufficient to afford protection to
35. Id. at 390. "[U]nless a contrary intent appears, [legislation of Congress] is
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States .... " Foley
Brothers v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). See also Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S.
421, 437 (1931).
36. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
37. The particular statute involved was section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). See note 22 supra for the text of rule 10b-5. Within the
language of 10(b) itself, the court found legislative intent to provide broad antifraud
protection on the purchase or sale of securities "whether or not these were traded on
organized United States markets .... " 468 F.2d at 1336.
38. 468 F.2d at 1334. The court concluded that in a situation in which material acts
occurred in the United States, "if Congress had thought about the point, it would . ..
have wished to protect an American investor if a foreigner comes to the United States
and fraudulently induces him to purchase securities abroad . . . ." Id. at 1337. On the
other hand, it would be erroneous to assume that the legislature always intends to go to
the full extent permitted [by the Restatement]." Id. at 1334. See also Travis v. Anthes
Imperial, 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
19761
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foreign investors. 9 The Second Circuit took a different view, de-
termining that the fraud, if any, was perpetrated by delivering
the final defrauding prospectus to the purchasers in the United
States. 0 It concluded that the source of the final fraudulent state-
ment, in this case a foreign source, was the key to determining
the issue of jurisdiction;4 all of the activities in the United States
prior to the issuance of the defrauding prospectus were found to
be only preliminary, and "relatively small in comparison to those
abroad. 4 2 In describing this transaction as predominantly for-
eign, the Second Circuit in effect found that the requirements of
section 17 had not been met.
On the basis of its conclusion that the United States activity
was preparatory, the Second Circuit stated that none of the mis-
representations occurred in the nation "whose law is sought to be
applied. 4 3 The significant United States activity found in
Leasco was not deemed present in Bersch. Further, the "essential
link" theory espoused by the district court in Bersch with regard
to United States activity was rejected by the circuit court. Al-
though the Second Circuit stated that congressional intent need
not be constrained solely by the Restatement, it did recall the
assertion in Leasco that legislation need not always reach to the
full limits of due process.44 The court acknowledged that the Con-
gress did not intend that the United States serve as a "base for
fraudulent securities schemes even when the victims are foreign-
ers." However, it refused to extend the protection of the securi-
ties laws to foreign plaintiffs upon the first basis relied upon by
the district court in view of the predominantly foreign nature of
the transaction. Perhaps the real consideration underlying this
determination was the question of "whether Congress would have
wished the precious resources of United States courts and law
enforcement agencies to be devoted to . . . [predominantly for-
eign transactions] rather than leave the problem to foreign coun-
tries.""
39. 389 F. Supp. at 458.
40. 519 F.2d at 987.
41. The Drexel Group prospectus emanated from either London or Brussels, the IOB
prospectus from the Bahamas and Geneva, and the Crang prospectus from Toronto. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 468 F.2d at 1334.
45. 519 F.2d at 987.
46. Id. at 985. "The management of a class action with many thousands of class
members imposes tremendous burdens on overtaxed district courts, even when the class
[Vol. 11:2
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Ill. ADVERSE GENERAL EFFECTS
The only evidence considered by the Court of Appeals to
determine the existence of adverse general effects, the third juris-
dictional basis found by the district court, was an affidavit by an
expert in the field of finance.4 7 On the basis of the affidavit, the
district court concluded that jurisdiction was proper because the
offering of false prospectuses and the collapse of IOS severely
impaired the confidence of investors, particularly foreign inves-
tors, in the American securities market. This loss of confidence
threatened to reduce or curtail the large inflow of foreign capital
into the American securities market with attendant "breakdown
in the entire structure . . . of [the] offshore investing industry
. . 'N' The circuit court rejected the affidavit, and with it the
third basis of jurisdiction.
The district court's theory of subject matter jurisdiction,
which is predicated upon a substantial and foreseeable effect
within the United States from fraudulent conduct committed
abroad by foreign defendants, would seem to fit within the objec-
tive territorial principle of section 18 of the Restatement.49 This
members are mostly in the United States and still more so when they are abroad." Id. at
996 (footnote omitted).
47. Professor Morris Mendelson concluded, inter atia, that:
(1) The aftermath of the Drexel offering "was a debacle of monumental pro-
portions which resulted in a deterioration of investor confidence in American
underwriters at home and, particularly, abroad," and increased the problems
of United States corporations in seeking to raise capital abroad.
(2) "The false and misleading prospectus issued in connection with the Public
Offering impaired investors' confidence and trust and contributed to a steep
decline in the purchase of United States securities by foreigners" with attendant
adverse effects on the balance of payments and the price of American securities
generally.
(4) Part of the attraction of American securities to foreigners has been the
superior disclosures afforded by SEC registration requirements. The collapse of
IOS after the offering undermined this confidence since IOS was "identified as
an American company in the minds of investors" ....
(5) The collapse of IOS after the offering "contributed to a breakdown in the
entire structure of building up an offshore investing industry whereby funds of
European investors were channeled into American. securities markets."
519 F.2d at 987-88.
48. Id. at 988.
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §18
(1965) provides that:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences
to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its terri-
tory, if either
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approach was relied upon by the Second Circuit in Schoenbaum
v. Firstbrook.50 In that case, an American investor in a Canadian
corporation which was registered with the SEC and listed on the
American Stock Exchange brought a derivative action which
charged the corporation with rule 10b-5 violations. Although
there was no illegal activity in the United States, the court held
that the negative effects on the value of the American plaintiff's
stock which directly resulted from the foreign conduct was suffi-
cient to justify a finding that jurisdiction existed. The court thus
applied rule 10b-5 extraterritorially where there was a loss suf-
fered by an American investor.5' In Bersch, the Second Circuit
distinguished Schoenbaum and refused to find subject matter
jurisdiction.
52
The argument that jurisdiction could be grounded upon the
general detrimental effects on American investors was rejected by
Bersch as being overly broad. As the Leasco court stated,
the language of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act is much
too inconclusive to lead us to believe that Congress meant to
impose rules governing conduct throughout the world in every
instance where an American company bought or sold a secu-
rity.
5 3
Bersch rejected the argument that the "generalized effects.
[were] sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction over a
damage suit by a foreigner under the anti-fraud provisions of the
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements
of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal
systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to
which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it
occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and
(iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized
by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
50. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd in part and remanded, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
51. Id. at 208. See also United States v. Clark, 359 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), in
which jurisdiction was grounded on the combination of clear fraudulent conduct in the
United States and the detrimental effects of such conduct on American investors.
52. In Schoenbaum, the stock was listed on a national exchange and therefore
defendant reasonably should have expected many Americans to invest in the corporation.
In Bersch, sales of IOS shares were inexplicably made to 386 Americans; the court, in
rejecting jurisdiction, was more concerned with the intent of IOS, as stated in its pro.
spectus, to exclude American investors. Additionally, IOS was not listed on any national
exchange nor was it registered with the SEC.
53. 468 F.2d at 1334.
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securities laws." 4 The detrimental effects concept even when
coupled with IOS' preparatory activity within the United States,
was held insufficient to permit jurisdiction over this essentially
foreign transaction. 5
IV. SALES TO AMERICANS
The second basis for subject matter jurisdiction urged by the
district court was that sales in the 1OS Public Offering scheme
were made to Bersch and an estimated 385 other United States
citizens through the IOB secondary offering. The circuit court
distinguished between the American purchasers living in the
United States and those living abroad. As to the Americans
resident in the United States, it was willing to presume that de-
frauding prospectuses were mailed to them in the United States. 6
In establishing a standard for determining subject matter juris-
diction as to this category of Americans, the court analogized to
section 18 of the Restatement and stated that activity in the
United States was "not necessary when subject matter jurisdic-
tion is predicated on a direct effect here."5 The recipients' reli-
ance on the misrepresentations contained in the prospectuses was
the required "direct effect," and thus the court held the protec-
tion of the securities laws to apply to Americans resident in the
United States.-
The court next considered whether it had subject matter
jurisdiction as to the nonresident American purchasers. Recog-
nizing that the issue involved presented "a different and closer
question," 9 it noted that "Congress surely did not mean the se-
curities laws to protect the many thousands of Americans residing
in foreign countries against securities frauds by foreigners acting
there" in the absence of sufficient activity within the United
States.6" The activities by defendants within the United States,
though "merely preparatory," were deemed sufficient to warrant
the exercise of the court's jurisdiction as to nonresident Ameri-
cans in the class. The requisite proof entailed "acts of material
54. 519 F.2d at 988 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).
55. Had the Bersch court found substantial United States activity, perhaps the argu-
ment of "detrimental effects within from conduct without" would have been more readily
accepted.
56. Id. at 991.
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 992.
60. Id.
19761
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
importance" within the United States which "significantly con-
tributed" to those plaintiffs' losses.' The court did not, however,
explain how the preparatory activities within the United States
met this standard.
Having found jurisdiction as to both categories of American
purchasers in the class, the court turned to the question of
whether to exercise its jurisdiction as to the large number of non-
resident foreign investors. Reversing the district court, the Sec-
ond Circuit held that "merely preparatory activities in the United
States are not enough to trigger application of the securities laws
for injury to foreigners located abroad ... ."I' The court pre-
scribed a requirement that the losses to foreigners must have been
"directly caused" by acts within the United States, a higher de-
gree of causation than the "significant contribution" standard
imposed in the case of nonresident Americans. 3 Without explain-
ing the basis for its conclusion," the court found that there was
no direct causal link between the preparatory activities within
the United States and the losses incurred abroad by the foreign
purchasers.
V. IT v. VENCAP, LTD.
It is not to be concluded from Bersch that in every instance
foreign plaintiffs who have suffered losses due to violations of
federal securities laws at the hands of foreign defendants will be
denied access to United States courts. Bersch's importance lies
in the fact that it is the first decision to recognize that a foreign
investor has a cause of action where an "act" within the United
States directly causes losses to that purchaser from sales made
abroad. While the foreign plaintiffs in Bersch failed to meet this
test, the case represents an expansive view of the extraterritorial
application of federal securities laws. Bersch laid the foundation
for the Second Circuit's decision in a companion case decided the
61. Id. at 993.
62. Id. at 992.
63. Id. at 993 (emphasis added).
64. We freely acknowledge that if we were asked to point to language in the
statutes, or even in the legislative history, that compelled these conclusions, we
would be unable to respond . . . . Our conclusions rest on case law and com-
mentary concerning the application of the securities laws and other statutes to
situations with foreign elements and on our best judgment as to what Congress




same day, by the same three-judge panel, IT v. Vencap, Ltd. 5
In IT, a Luxembourg investment trust brought a rule 10b-5
action against Vencap, Ltd., a Bahamian venture capital organi-
zation. Subject matter jurisdiction was predicated upon the ac-
tivities of Vencap in the United States. These included the prepa-
ration of a memorandum containing material misstatements and
omissions in the United States, as well as the use of the New York
office of defendants' attorneys as a base for initiating, directing,
and consummating "literally hundreds of transactions."6 It was
concluded that where the United States is "used as a base for
manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export," subject
matter jurisdiction will attach even where these securities are
"peddled only to foreigners.""7 The court reasoned that if Con-
gress intended the enforcement of securities laws to "prevent the
concoction of securities frauds in the United States for export,"
a necessary corollary would be subject matter jurisdiction of the
United States courts over an action by a defrauded foreign plain-
tiff."5 Bersch had laid down the vague standard that the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws permit a cause of action to foreign
investors only where the "acts . . . within the United States di-
rectly caused" the losses. 9 IT attempted to clarify this test by
finding that the acts necessary to confer subject matter jurisdic-
tion must be fraudulent and also that the fraud contain the ele-
ments of a rule 10b-5 violation.
70
65. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
66. Id. at 1018.
67. Id. at 1017.
68. Id. at 1018.
69. 519 F.2d at 993 (emphasis added).
70. As originally viewed by the courts, the elements of a 10b-5 violation in private
actions corresponded closely to the traditional elements of common law fraud: misrepre-
sentation of a material fact, reliance, scienter, and damages. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d
724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). Several recent decisions have demonstrated a marked trend
toward modifying or even rejecting some of these standard elements. See, e.g., Affiliated
Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Superintendent of Insurance
of the State of New York v. Bankers Life and Casualty, 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Green v. Santa
Fe Industries, Inc., Civil No. 75-7256 (2d Cir., Feb. 18, 1976), rehearing denied, [Current]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,472 (2d Cir. Mar. 10, 1976). (The Second Circuit found the
case to be of "such importance" that it was "confident that the Supreme Court [would]
accept these matters under its certiorari jurisdiction," but a petition for certiorari has not
yet been filed.); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975); Lanza
v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc); Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969). It has become clear, however, that mere
negligence will not support a 10b-5 complaint. The Supreme Court has recently held, in
a case involving the conduct of a United States accounting firm, that such suits must
1976]
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The Bersch/IIT analysis was applied by the courts for the
first, time in F. O.F. Proprietary Funds Ltd. v. Arthur Young &
Co.,71 where the foreign plaintiff, a Canadian mutual fund organi-
zation, sought relief for an alleged rule 10b-5 violation. In resolv-
ing the primary issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the District
Court for the Southern District of New York followed IIT and
Bersch in examining congressional intent as to the application of
United States securities laws to the facts presented. The court
determined that Congress would not have intended the securities
laws to apply to this "predominantly foreign" transaction.
72
Plaintiff, a subsidiary of 1OS, was "a foreign company which ac-
quired its shares abroad, purchased from a foreign company...
and purchased allegedly in reliance upon the offering circulars
which apparently were distributed to it outside the United
States.'73 Quite clearly, plaintiff failed to meet the jurisdictional
standards promulgated in Bersch and IT since the material acts
allegedly causing plaintiff's losses occurred abroad. In denying
subject matter jurisdiction, however, the court was not forced to
reach the more specific problem posed by a Bersch/IIT analysis,
i. e., whether a particular instance of fraudulent activity within
the United States is sufficiently within the ambit of a rule 10b-5
violation to permit subject matter jurisdiction as to foreign plain-
tiffs. 74
While it appears that the Second Circuit has established a
cause of action for the protection of foreign investors whose losses
can truly be attributed to fraudulent acts committed in the
United States, it will not extend the protection of United States
securities laws to those transactions it deems essentially foreign.
Kathleen M. Paolo
allege an "intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S.
Ct. 1375 (1976).
71. 400 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
72. Id. at 1222.
73. Id. at 1222-23.
74. It is significant that in F. O.F. the court found that the plaintiff purchasers had
knowingly purchased the securities in express violation of the federal securities laws. Id.
at 1221.
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